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Dr. Gatewood: Terry College is very happy to be one of the cosponsors for
today's conference. As recent events have indicated, setting up democracies
in Iraq and Afghanistan will be very difficult, but we in the College, and I hope
our panelists today, think that one of the underpinnings for setting up a
democracy in both of these countries will be the establishment of a private
market system. We believe that private markets are essential for the economic
development and prosperity of each of these countries and that economic
prosperity is a key foundation for democratic stability.
Our first speaker will be Tim Mills. Tim is from the Washington, D.C.
office of the law firm Patton Boggs. With more than twenty years' experience
representing businesses in national and international matters, he has recently
led his firm's Iraq Reconstruction practice group, which helps companies grasp
the challenges of competing for U.S. government contracts for reconstruction
projects in Iraq. His repeated trips to that country, including one completed
within the past week, give him unique insights into the formation of a
democratic private market in post-war Iraq and Afghanistan. Among many
other things of interest about Tim is that for the past twenty-five years he has
served in the U.S. Army, both on active duty and in the Army Reserves.
Timothy Mills: Thank you very much. I want to say what a pleasure it is to be
here. I left Baghdad on the eleventh of this month and I will be going back to
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Baghdad on the twenty-second. So this is just a brief respite from the travails
of doing business in Iraq. I want to particularly thank the Journal and the
University of Georgia for giving us an opportunity to share perspectives that
few have, because few are there and even fewer are staying, given the current
developments in the last ten days.
First, before proceeding into the substance, I want to share with you some
of the perspectives I have on the state of market democracy in Iraq, particularly
in comparison with the development of market democracy in Afghanistan. I
ask you to consider my analytical perspective. First, I adopt the methodologies
of both the comparative historian and the lawyer. I look at the evidence of
what has been and what is, with a view toward the potential positive and
negative in states of what is likely to be. I consider what could be both
positive and negative, and most importantly, what should be, particularly in the
view of the nationals, in this case Iraqis and Afghans, who must live with
whatever actions the United States and international community take and leave
behind, whatever those circumstances are.
Second, I am not an academic; I am a lawyer. I do not believe in basing
decisions, policies, or business actions on an assessment of what is presumed
to be. Rather, I look at the state of what currently is and make critical
assessments informed by the skeptical methodology of a trial lawyer. These
assessments are based on all the available facts and the inferences that can be
drawn from the facts. In the case of Iraq, my understanding of the facts and the
informed analysis that I give to you is based on thirteen long visits to Iraq since
July. During this time I have examined over 220 Iraqi businesses in various
parts of the country, of various sizes, from the largest businesses in the
country, headed by the traditional families of Iraq, to the midsize and the much
smaller businesses. I have examined emerging businesses, long-established
businesses, businesses that are bankrupt, and businesses that are robust. I have
met with the most senior Iraqi business leaders, political leaders, business
executives, budding entrepreneurs, the ministers, director-generals of state-
owned enterprises, and politicians from political parties that have been
excluded by the United States from the political decision-making pro-
cess-which I submit to you was a mistake.
In addition, I have had the opportunity to meet with several provincial
governors and with the Americans within the provisional authority who are
making the policies and decisions that drive the expenditure of $18.6 billion,
along with some donor money as well, totaling tens of millions of dollars.
They believe they are advancing market democracy through unilateral acts that
are made largely without the consultation of the Iraqi stakeholder communities.
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Therefore, there is some question as to whether those policies are either widely
supported or widely understood by the stakeholder communities that are most
interested and most affected.
In the case of Afghanistan, my understanding is based on extensive surveys
of what is happening on the ground, but to nowhere near the depth of some of
the others who have spoken today who have been there much longer and much
more frequently and are thus more aware. I must thank Mariam Nawabi, who
you heard this morning. She is bright and informed; I want to thank her for
sharing her insights.
Moving into the substance, we must ask: What is market democracy? My
answer is simple. Based on Iraq, based on Afghanistan, and based on other
places, market democracy is the opportunity, for those who wish to do so, to
conduct business and to reap the benefits of achievement in business through
merit on a level playing field free of obstruction and free of the effects of
favoritism, from regimes and otherwise, in the marketplace; favoritisms that
flow from class, family, position, and, of course, corruption.
As a second step of addressing the substance, we also must ask: What are
the essential elements, the tools in the entrepreneurs' and the policy makers'
toolboxes, in creating and sustaining market democracy, how these dynamics
of market democracy are created if they do not exist, and how they are
established and expanded to the point of being truly effective in post-socialist
states such as Iraq and Afghanistan? In my view, there are essentially four
tools. Each one must exist or you will never achieve a market democracy. The
four tools are as follows:
1. The rule of law: The criminal, civil, and commercial law that
creates a fair and equitable environment that, in substance and
application, can be forcibly applied, even by businesses
against other businesses, to protect and foment a competitive
but fair environment and particularly precludes those who
formerly were advantaged and are predatory in nature,
because their businesses are essentially monopolies, from
continuing to exploit their dominant positions in the market-
place.
2. The availability of capital and other financial facilities that
provide the needed working capital to begin operating and
expanding business. This is something well-known in the
West and in Asia, but the availability of capital is not well-
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known in Iraq. It is certainly less well-known in Afghanistan
than it is in Iraq.
3. Access to markets unimpeded by those who have typically
and traditionally exercised near-monopoly or actual monopoly
powers in the days of prior regimes.
4. The availability of modern business management systems and
capabilities combined with business partnerships between
capable firms from outside those particular countries. This
tool, based on my observations in Iraq, can create and give the
strongest competitive advantages to emerging businesses, to
those mid- and small-level businesses that in the days of the
old regimes, in Afghanistan and particularly in Iraq, could not
grow above a certain level and did not want to grow above a
certain level out of fear for being brought to the attention of
the regimes to be slapped down or taken over. There are
myriad stories about such businesses and I tell you that now,
with that cap gone, they do want to grow. Let me give you
one example of what I mean by the competitive advantage of
partnership. I was in Iraq in September when the Finance
Minister of Iraq went to Dubai and, at the Finance Minister's
Conference, announced the new foreign direct investment law
that had been written by the Coalition Provisional Authority.'
It provided the most favorable foreign investment law in all of
the Arab world. One hundred percent foreign direct
investment-owned companies could exist in Iraq! This is true
nowhere outside of Iraq in the Arab world; those companies
could exist without needing a local Iraqi agent or any local
representation. The outcry from the large Iraqi firms was
immense.
I was asked by the Australian Broadcasting Company to comment on this.
I looked at what the heads of these Iraqi businesses were saying and I talked
to them about what they were saying. They were saying, "This country is
going to be swamped, we are going to be out of business, all of our advantage
is going to be gone." I told them, "Well, you know, this is very interesting,
because you have to understand that if you really perceived what your
Foreign Investment, Ord. No. 39, Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA/ORD]19
September 2003/39 (2003).
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opportunities were here in this country, you not only would be able to take
advantage of these opportunities, which are not what they were before, but you
would be able to partner, you would be able to do other things that would put
you in an even more dominant position than you are now." And they asked
me, "Well, how do you see us?" I was very candid with them-Iraqis
appreciate American candor as long as it is over a cup of Iraqi tea-I said,
"The way I see you guys is this: you are wearing glasses with blinders on and
you have lenses in the glasses that are mirrors and all you can do is look
backward in a very narrow perspective." The entrepreneurs that emerged in
Iraq outside of these businesses are not wearing those glasses. With partner-
ships with Western businesses, non-Iraqi businesses, European businesses, and
Asian businesses, all of which desire to come to Iraq and partner, the
entrepreneurs can become dominant in their own particular marketplaces.
Where does the progression of market democracy stand now in Iraq as
compared to Afghanistan and where will things go in the short-term? Let us
examine Iraq. With respect to the rule of law, there is a lot to be done. A few
glaring observations tell it all. We have antitrust law in the United States-we
have had it since the early 1900s when Teddy Roosevelt decided to bust the
Standard Oil trust. There is no such thing as antitrust law in Iraq and that
means you can be as predatory as you want.
Also, there is no such thing as an action for interference with economic
advantage or contract in Iraq. You can bring a lawsuit in an Iraqi court for
breach of contract, but if someone interferes with your contracts there will be
no action. Further, business opportunities and advantages come out of
intellectual property. However, the intellectual property laws of Iraq are, in
fact, in need of reform. Microsoft will not go into Iraq because it does not
have the protections it needs; others will not go into Iraq for the same reason.
I can get a copy of Microsoft Office for two dollars on the streets in Baghdad
and it works fine. But of course I do not because I am an American lawyer and
I do not want to be sued by Microsoft. But Iraqis do. How do you develop an
intellectual property industry in Iraq under these circumstances? The
commercial law of Iraq is fairly well-developed, however. When you look at
the law of contract in Iraq, it has a legal tradition that goes back to the
Ottomans. Thus, there is a movement afoot right now to revise the laws of Iraq
to provide protections for businesses and to create a business-friendly
environment for entrepreneurs.
The second observation concerns the availability of capital and financial
facilities. I like to tell a tale of "Where is the money coming from?" For the
traditional family businesses, follow the money. Less than two months after
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the Saddam regime fell, I was invited to the home of one of the most wealthy
Iraqi businessmen. He said, "Look, I'd like you to represent me in Washing-
ton." I thought, "Wow, you know, this is a very enlightened guy." I said,
"You have no other lawyers?" He replied, "I have those twenty lawyers that
work for me in Geneva and I have all the money I earned under Saddam's
regime in Geneva."
Those Iraqis have deep capital and they use it. They use it to buy up and
gain influence over Iraqi mid-size finns. The mid-sized firms come to them
and say, "I need money to perform this contract that I just got but I don't have
the money." The wealthy Iraqis say, "Fine, I'll give you the money, you give
me fifty-percent of the contract and a seat on the board I'll control your
business henceforth and we'll have a wonderful partnership." It is a good
arrangement for those that loan the money.
There are no banks in Iraq that currently loan to businesses in any
significant way. The Al-Rasheed Bank, the state-owned bank, is having
extreme difficulties. It was used as an instrument of the Hussein regime to
loan to businesses the regime favored but it is not lending now. One of the
major problems is getting loans into the country. There is a $500 million
facility that has been established by U.S. taxpayer dollars and they are looking
for projects from Iraqi businesses.
This observation brings me to my next point, regarding barriers to market
entry. How difficult is it to enter a market in Iraq and capture a share of that
market? For companies that sell automobiles, like GM, or sell food, or similar
businesses, it is difficult. You do not want to be in these businesses in Iraq
unless you want to deal with companies that act predatorily and have seen the
market up. However, there is a vibrant entrepreneurial class in Iraq and they
know how to do business. They know how to do business because they did
business under some of the most adverse conditions that existed: under the
Hussein regime and under the UN sanctions regime. They have found ways
to get by.
If you are in Iraq and you want to become entrepreneurial, then it is better
to find your way into an area where business has not existed before. What are
some of those areas? For one, petrochem. There is only one petrochem plant
and it is owned by the state. But with the amount of oil in Iraq, there is plenty
of opportunity, if you happen to know how to do it, to enter into partnerships
with some of the Western firms that are in petrochem. There are also
agriculture and processing and technology businesses such as IT and Internet
service providers. Think of Iraq being like 1950s town, with hardly anything
connected technologically. Finance and insurance: Did you know every
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American company that goes to work in Iraq wants to buy insurance? Nobody
is selling insurance in Iraq! And financing of contracts, financing of cars, and
financing of mortgages-that business does not exist.
Back to number four: the availability of modem business management
systems and partnerships with capable non-Iraqi businesses. This will require
a lot of work because mid-size and small businesses have not done this before.
It will require reeducation of the Western partners to not go to the large
companies that were favored by the regime, because the real opportunity in
Iraq is not with those companies (some Western firms have had some
difficulties with those companies), but instead with the medium-sized and
smaller firms. Unfortunately, it is difficult to find information on who they are
or what their capabilities are if you do not speak Arabic. Very few American
businesses going to Iraq bring Arabic language speakers with them.
Turning to Afghanistan, I will be short and speak summarily because so
much has been covered on the rule of law in Afghanistan. The rule of law in
Afghanistan and the commercial realm of law is beginning to develop in
Afghanistan. It is possible to do business in Afghanistan under the commercial
laws and you do not get the kind of interference you get in Iraq. Afghanistan
does not have the problem of predatory firms.
As for number two, the availability of capital: recognizing that a market
economy needs capital to establish businesses, the availability of capital in
Afghanistan is slight to none for most Afghan businesses. With respect to
barriers to market entry and penetration and the ability to capture market share:
typically this has been a problem because you could not compete with the
state-owned enterprises in Afghanistan under Afghan law. However, that has
been swept aside and they are flat right now (by flat I mean hardly opera-
tional).
The barrier to market entry and capturing market share comes from the
bureaucracy. How many ministries do you have to stop in to get permits to do
business? The attendant corruption that goes with the acquisition of licenses
and permits is also a barrier that needs to be addressed.
With respect to availability of modem business systems and partnerships
with non-Afghan-capable businesses: there are two or three examples of
success with this in Afghanistan. One is the hotel sector, where there have
been somejoint ventures between the Afghan state-owned enterprises that own
the hotel facilities; and firms like Hyatt, Marriott, and Intercontinental.
Another is the communications sector, where the entire telecom structure of
Afghanistan, including the operating company, has essentially gone private
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with a partnership from outside Afghanistan. Otherwise, in these sectors, there
has been tremendous struggle.
What is the lesson from all of this? The lesson is that thirteen years from
the end of the Cold War, we still struggle to do the things we know we must
do. Yet, I am very optimistic about Iraq in the long term. I think in the next
three to five years, Iraq will emerge as economically vibrant. Within ten years,
provided we solve the security problem, Iraq will become the jewel of the
Middle East. I am not so sanguine about Afghanistan because there is so much
more work to be done and so many problems to face. But we have come a long
way in a short time in Iraq; we are not quite so far away in Afghanistan. The
success of market democracy will be the one determinant of whether we have
political and social stability in both places.
I will leave you with this one thought: In the 1930s we had unemployment
in the United States that rose to almost thirty percent of heads of households.
We had a political crisis that almost resulted in revolution. In Iraq, I give you
this one figure: In Fallujah and Ramadi, eighty percent of the heads of
households are out of work and have been out of work for a year. In the rest
of the country sixty percent of the heads of households are unemployed.
Unless we solve this problem and solve it through the creation of market
democracy, we will not see stability in either Iraq or Afghanistan. Thank you.
Dr. Gatewood. Tim, thank you very much. Keith Crane is a Senior Economist
at the RAND Corporation where he works on issues pertaining to Iraq and the
Middle East, post-conflict societies, and the transition economies of Eastern
Europe. In the autumn of 2003, Dr. Crane was on loan to the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq as an advisor on economic policy. While
in Iraq, Dr. Crane participated on task forces involved in developing economic
policies on exchange rates, price liberalization, and the social safety net. Prior
to his work in Iraq, Dr. Crane was a co-author of the RAND book, America's
Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq.2 He has also served as Chief
Operating Officer and Director of Research at PlanEcon Inc., a Washington,
D.C.-based research and consulting firm focusing on Central and Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet republics. In addition to his work at RAND and
in the private sector, he has taught at Georgetown and George Mason
universities and has held a Fulbright Professorship at the Central School of
Planning and Statistics in Warsaw, Poland. Few individuals are as qualified
2 JAMES DOBBINS ET AL., AMERICA'S ROLE INNATION-BUILDING: FROM GERMANY TO IRAQ
(2003), available at http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1753/.
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to discuss present and future economic conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan as
Dr. Crane.
Keith Crane: I would like to thank the University of Georgia and Clete
Johnson for inviting me here. The CPA, or the Coalition Provisional
Authority, is the governing authority of Iraq until June 30.' Last fall, I had the
honor of working with Ambassador Paul Bremer on economic policy at CPA.
My efforts did not meet with a lot of success, but I did have an impact on tariff
policy and exchange rate policy. A number of other things were left undone.
The CPA has three main objectives for Iraq. One is to create a safe, secure
environment for Iraqis. As you know, the security environment has actually
deteriorated in recent months. The second is to create a democracy and the
third is to create a market economy. Market economies have been proven to
provide the only means of generating sustained growth and increasing per
capita incomes, making people better off. Thus, creating a market economy
was a key objective of the CPA.
The question facing us in Iraq was how to get from a distorted, state-
controlled economy to a well-functioning market. First, however, we need to
define where "here" was. The other speakers made some excellent comments
about economic conditions in Iraq at the end of the conflict. However, I
thought it would be useful to throw out a few facts and figures before talking
about where Iraq is heading. I will also talk about some of the stumbling
blocks that exist in Iraq to creating an environment for strong growth.
Through February 2004, Iraqis enjoyed a substantial increase in living
standards and output since the end of the conflict. This should not be too
surprising. The United States has spent an awful lot of money on Iraq. It
would have been very puzzling if nothing had happened.
The increase in living standards comes from a very low base. Anytime a
country is at war, the economy all but stops. During last March and April, the
economy in Baghdad had stopped. U.S. tanks and armored personnel carriers
were roaming the streets. Once the economy began to function again, the
percentage growth in output was very rapid. By February 2004, oil output had
gone up to near to or above pre-invasion levels. Electricity output has
recovered pretty rapidly as well. There has been a huge inflow of cash into the
economy.
' Foreign Investment, Ord. No. 39, Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA/ORD/19
September 2003/39 (2003).
2004]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Much of the cash has gone into government salaries, with the result that
employment in government has become attractive again. I talked to one store
owner:-before the invasion, he was much better off working in the private
sector than in the government. In fact, he had abandoned a governmentjob to
set up a tiny store, not much bigger than this table, where he sells Coca-Cola,
crackers, and other foodstuffs. He was making more money running that store
than hanging around in the government bureaucracy. Thanks to our generosity,
entry-level government wages have risen to $60 a month and, for many
positions, are now up to $120. This may not sound like a lot of money but it
is several times what government workers were making last year at this time.
It is also much more than the store owner was making.
As a consequence of all this money coming in and increases in government
salaries, there has been a huge influx of imported consumer goods into Iraq.
Anyone who has been in Iraq, especially in Baghdad, but also in the other
towns, has seen piles of imported consumer electronics and appliances sold on
the street markets. Under Saddam, partly because of sanctions, partly because
of the regime, if you wanted to buy a color TV or a Sony Walkman or an air
conditioner, forget it. The only people with access to imported goods were
those with government connections.
After CPA eliminated tariffs and other barriers to trade, Iraqis were able to
enjoy the benefits of free trade. Now, they can buy anything they want.
Trucks are rolling across the border. All of downtown Baghdad is filled with
television sets and air conditioners.
I was puzzled as to how expensive goods can be sold in open air street
markets in a country which has a pretty high crime rate. How is this possible?
Virtually everybody is armed in Iraq, including street vendors. The vendors
collaborate. If anybody grabs something and starts to run, all of the merchants,
not just the merchant from whom he steals, go after the thief.
For several months after the invasion, there were no statistics on inflation
and employment. Finally, some statistics have been published: inflation is
pretty high, 36%,' a figure to which Americans have a hard time relating.
Earlier in the mid-i 990s, however, inflation in Iraq had reached very high
rates, over 400%. Although nowhere near these levels, inflation is still quite
high right now. This rate of inflation is partly due to all the money that has
flowed into Iraq, and partly because Iraq has a very weak central bank.
4 See, e.g., Coalition Provisional Authority, Creating a SoundandModern Banking System,
at http://cpa-iraq.org/bank/banking-pager.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2004).
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One of the things I did in Iraq was to work with the Central Bank. I was a
senior adviser to the Iraqi delegation that met with the International Monetary
Fund in Amman, Jordan. Based on my experiences, the Central Bank is not yet
very good at its job and it has a long way to go.
A number of individuals claim that Iraq's unemployment rate is 50-60%.
These unemployment figures are exaggerated. Most people in Iraq work in the
informal economy; in fact in most developing countries most people work in
the informal economy, either running their own very small businesses or
working as day laborers. For example, the warehouses that distribute food do
not have many permanent employees but hire day laborers as needed. Use of
day laborers is quite common in the United States as well. In Washington,
D.C. or L.A., if you want someone to help with your garden or want to do a
little construction work, you can go to street comers and hire young men from
Mexico or El Salvador who will work for a day. Much of Iraq's labor market
operates this way.
Official unemployment figures are more accurate than those cited by the
press. The national statistical office recently completed a labor force
participation survey; they found that the unemployment rate was about 26%.'
In short, most people in Iraq do not receive a weekly paycheck, but they do
work or are searching for work on a daily basis. Some days they find work,
some days they do not.
Although most Iraqis would prefer a regular paycheck, the major problem
for Iraqi workers is not so much how steady work is, but how much they earn.
Iraqis are quite poor, much poorer than I had expected them to be. If any of
you have been to Mexico, it is a lot better off than Iraq. It is not as poor as
Afghanistan, however.
Where does Iraq go from here? 2004 and 2005 are likely to be good years,
if the security situation does not continue to deteriorate. Increased oil output
and the influx of U.S. aid should lead to rapid growth in the Iraqi economy.
However, the security situation could derail growth. In July 2003, CPA
employees would visit Babylon on weekends and were fairly comfortable
moving around Baghdad. By fall, the security situation had deteriorated. The
Ba'athists, Wahaabists, who came from Saudi Arabia, and Al-Qaeda were
making concerted efforts to keep things hot in Iraq. However, even at that
time, the insurgents did not consist of a huge number of individuals. The
violence was heavily concentrated in the Sunni areas, sometimes called the
"Sunni Triangle," which includes Fallujah and Tikrit.
5 See, e.g., id.
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The violence has worsened greatly in the last month. Iraq has moved from
a situation where just a few individuals are involved in the violence to one
where a substantial number of people are willing to engage in violence to push
the Americans out. For example, in Fallujah, 60,000 out of 300,000 inhabit-
ants are camped outside of the town because of the threat of a Marine
operation taking place in the city. In short, if the security situation gets worse,
the turmoil and shootings Will kill off economic growth.
The United States is making a big push to increase oil output and oil output
seems to be going up. Oil accounts for a large share of the Iraqi economy. It
is not the whole economy, however. Iraq benefits greatly from oil. Oil
provides virtually all government revenue. Because of oil reserves, Iraq
imposed virtually no other taxes. However, very few people work in the oil
sector. Out of roughly twenty-six million people, most are either working in
the informal economy (60% or so are trying to scratch out a living from the
informal economy) or they are working in government ministries: education,
health, et cetera. In Iraq, there is this peculiar situation where most of the
government's revenue comes from a sector which is state-owned, very
important, but has relatively few employees. Everybody else works in other
areas.
The Iraqi state owns a large number of enterprises; these in general are
disasters. I worked on policy towards state-owned enterprises and visited one
up north, a sugar refinery. This particular enterprise had been bombed in the
Iran-Iraq War. There is a big hole in the roof and nobody had gone back to
work for sixteen to seventeen years. Some of you probably had not even been
born when this factory was bombed yet all the workers are still on the payroll.
This story should give you a little sense of how things work in the state-owned
enterprise sector in Iraq.
If the violence declines, Iraq is likely to enjoy two years of growth. Much
of the growth in 2004 and 2005 will be funded by U.S. taxpayers. Congress
appropriated $18.3 billion for the reconstruction of Iraq. This is an enormous
amount of money: nearly as much money as we are providing in aid to the rest
of the world.6 No one country has received this much money since the
Marshall Plan.7 This sum is only slightly smaller than most estimates of the
size of the Iraqi economy.
6 CURT TARNOFF & LARRY NOwELS, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, FOREIGN AID: AN INTRODUC-
TORY OVERVIEW OF U.S. PROGRAMSANDPOLICY 15 (updated Apr. 15,2004), available at http://
www.fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/31987.pdf.
' Id. at 4.
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Despite the massive amount of assistance going to Iraq, I am pretty
pessimistic about long-term prospects for growth. The Iraqi economy is one
of the most distorted economies I have ever seen and I have looked at some
distorted economies. The greatest problem is distorted prices. Prices for
gasoline and diesel are ridiculous. The current prices of gasoline and diesel
fuel were set in the 1980s. At that time, they were somewhat normal.
However, Iraq suffered very high rates of inflation and Saddam never bothered
to change the prices. Consequently, gasoline is currently sold for 3.2¢ a gallon.
I had lunch with one young soldier in the National Guard. He said when he
returns home he is going to continue to drive to Iraq and fill up. At 3.2¢ a
gallon, a full tank costs less than a dollar.
What do we know from economics when you try to sell something at 3.2¢
a gallon in Iraq when the price in neighboring countries like Turkey is three
dollars a gallon? The Iraqis smuggle gasoline and diesel fuel to neighboring
countries to sell at the higher price. Smuggling of fuel is rampant. Every truck
coming into Iraq has extra tanks. The truckers fill up and drive back to Turkey
where they sell it for one hundred times the official price. The same thing
happened in Russia in 1991, when the current crop of Russian millionaires
made their fortunes by smuggling. Because fuel is being smuggled outside the
country and because the low price encourages waste, there is not enough fuel
in Iraq to meet demand. Iraqi motorists stand in line for hours to fill up their
tanks.
Price controls also create corruption. Across the river from where I lived
in the Green Zone, a large number of $500,000 homes are going up and brand
new BMW convertibles are seen on the streets. Where does this money come
from? It comes from people who have contacts in the Ministry of Oil who are
able to buy gasoline and diesel at the official price and ship it to somebody
who will pay them the market price for it.
No one starves in Iraq. Saddam put in place a food ration system that
provides everyone a monthly package of food: sugar, rice, beans, and other
staples. The system creaked along during the UN sanctions. During my stay,
I visited three stores which distributed food rations. Once the locals found I
was analyzing the system, I was immediately surrounded by a horde of Iraqi
housewives who gave me a list of complaints concerning the program. The
soap gives them a rash, they want lamb in the rations, and the rice is substan-
dard. Of course, they wanted me to fix these problems.
This ration system is highly dysfunctional. It prevents Iraqi farmers from
selling produce to their fellow citizens because everybody gets their food for
free. The system suffers from corruption all down the line. Many Iraqis are
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unhappy with the quality and selection of foods. It is a business that neither
the Iraqi government (especially the CPA) should be in. It needs to be
changed.
What has the CPA done in order to establish growth? In November 2003,
the U.S. Congress passed a large bill that provided $18.3 billion in supplemen-
tal funding for Iraq. This funding was provided to kick-start the economy.
The funding is not being used as well as it could. In some ways, funding
decisions are being made on the basis of last summer's wars. Last summer,
Iraq experienced continual blackouts. There was a perception, a correct one,
that the Iraqis became upset when the lights went out. The flip side of this
contention is, that if we can get the lights on, all of our problems will go away.
It reminded me almost of Lenin, who equated electrification with progress.8
The CPA slogan became "electrification equals pacification." Because of this
equation of electric power availability with popular unrest, the CPA placed a
very high priority on investing in electric power. The CPA also put a lot of
money into the new Iraqi army and also into water resources development.
The emphasis on electric power badly misallocates your tax dollars. Right
now, the CPA does not charge for electric power. So what do Iraqis do? They
go out and buy an air conditioner with their new salary (provided by the U.S.
government). Air conditioning is cheap because they do not have to pay for
the electricity to operate the air conditioner. You know as well as I do that the
biggest costs in air conditioning are the costs of running the thing. More air
conditioners result in greater demand for power, which is likely to cause even
longer blackouts this summer than last despite all the money that is going into
electric power investment. People are buying air conditioners faster than we
can build power plants.
The CPA is also spending $680 million of your money to import diesel fuel
and gasoline for Iraq. The Iraqi government then turns around and sells this
fuel at 3.2¢ a gallon. The fuel in turn is often sold by Iraqis to Turks and
Iranians and Syrians.
The supplemental funding has also been heavily skewed towards creating
a new Iraqi army. A good friend of mine recruited for the Iraqi army. Many
of the guys whojoined the new Iraqi army said that they chose to join the army
rather than the police or other security forces because they did not want to
shoot Iraqis. They want to defend their country but are not at all interested in
doing internal policing.
' See Propaganda in the Propaganda State, athttp://www.pbs.org/redfiles/prop/inv/prop-
inv-ins.htm.
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I do not know if you noticed in the newspaper, but last week one of the
battalions mutinied when commanded to fight in Fallujah. The soldiers said
that they were not going to go to Fallujah to shoot Iraqis.9 There was a real
mismatch between what was promised the enlistees and the mission that they
were called upon to perform. Funds would have been better spent on the
police. We need to expand police training. Iraqi police get two weeks of
training, are assigned to police stations which are not fortified, and are
expected to apprehend heavily armed criminals and to combat insurgents. Iraqi
police come from a long tradition of not doing anything but sitting around the
station house and drinking tea. In short, more should be spent on police
training and less on creating a new army that lacks a clear cut role.
What could we do instead? We need to fund more training and mentoring
of police. That should be the first priority. Unless there is an effective police
force in Iraq we are going to be in trouble. The problem in Iraq, as opposed to
Vietnam, is that two-thirds of Iraq's people live in cities. In an urban
environment, the only effective way to combat an insurgency is to have a
police force that is working with the local people. The police are the face of
the government to the local people and the providers of day-to-day security.
Iraq needs a good police force to create a modicum of security in the country.
U.S. assistance also needs to be used to install financial control systems in
government ministries. The government and outside auditors need to be able
to track how money is spent. Iraq also needs to put controls on how many
people are hired by the government. A good colleague of mine works as a
senior advisor in the Ministry of Electricity. The Ministry has increased the
number of director-generals, which is the same as an assistant secretary in the
United States, from eighteen to eighty in three months. And guess who got
those jobs? They were the friends and relatives of people on the Governing
Council.
One of the last tasks I was asked to do was to put together a small model of
the Iraqi economy and forecast output in the coming years. I found that unless
the current distortions in the economy are cleaned up, growth is likely to be
anemic. We have learned from the experiences of the transition economies
that until the prices are right, nothing works right. So as long as Iraq sells
gasoline and diesel fuel for next to nothing and electricity is given away, all of
the decisions in the economy are all going to be skewed, in many ways, the
wrong way.
9 See Thomas E. Ricks, Iraqi Battalion Refuses to 'Fight Iraqis', WASH. POST, Apr. 11,
2004, at Al, 2004 WL 74478897.
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Unless policies are changed and prices liberalized, unless Iraq gets rid of
a food rationing program that discriminates against Iraqi farmers, economic
growth will not have legs. Once supplemental spending disappears in 2005
and 2006, there will not be enough "oomph" in the economy to keep it
growing.
Dr. Gatewood: Thank you very much. Our third speaker is Lee Reed,
Professor of Legal Studies and Real Estate in the Terry College of Business.
Except for a visiting professorship at the Wharton School of Business, he has
spent his entire career here, and has been a very valuable member of our
faculty, former president of the Academy of Legal Studies and Business and
a former editor-in-chief of the American Business Law Journal, he has
received five national research awards in his discipline and has been a
recipient of a senior award of excellence, the highest award that the 1,000
member academy grants. During the last decade his work has come to focus
on the role of property-based legal systems as a foundation for prosperous
private markets. Lee will argue that the gradual institution of a strong
property-based legal system under the rule of law provides the best hope for
a prosperous and free democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Lee Reed: How can I possibly disagree with my distinguished colleagues?
They have spent more time in Iraq between them than everyone else in this
room combined. I do not intend to disagree with them. In fact, they each have
said something that I agree with thoroughly. Tim Mills has said we need the
rule of law in Iraq and Afghanistan' and I agree with that fully. Keith Crane
has talked about the importance of the private market.I" I could hardly hold my
head up in the business school if I did not think the private market was of vital
significance to the creation of wealth and prosperity as people define it. But
there is something else that they have not talked about yet and that is fortunate
for me because it left me with something to say today.
Five hundred years ago, all of the world was poor. In many respects, the
Europeans arriving in the New World had standards of living lower than the
Native Americans. But now, some nations are prosperous while others are
impoverished. Why? What happened? Let me give you a fairly new but
increasingly accepted view, accepted by Alan Greenspan, by George Bush, by
Bill Clinton, and by the last three Treasury secretaries. And also by the G-8
o See infra p. 197.
See infra p. 203.
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finance ministers who will soon meet on the coast of Georgia.12 Their view
and mine is that the connection between private markets, rule of law, and
prosperity can be explained by just three concepts: property, property,
property.
I assert that the maximum conditions for national prosperity can come only
from the institution of property. This certainly applies in Iraq and Afghanistan,
but it also applies to emerging economies everywhere. The concept of
property has great explanatory power. I will warn you in advance: this may be
a little different from the way you are used to thinking of property. However,
property explains why Western and some Pacific Rim nations are prosperous
while most other nations are impoverished. It explains why the devastated
economies of Europe rebounded so quickly at the end of World War II. It
explains why West Germany had one of the highest national per capita
incomes in the world when East Germany, the same people, with the same
education, and the same background, lagged far behind. Property explains why
South Koreans are driving Hyundais and Kias in the streets of Seoul while
North Koreans are starving. It explains why the United States has seven times
the per capita income of its neighbor to the south, Mexico; why Japan went
from being a defeated nation of poor peasants to a wealthy industrial giant in
a mere handful of years. Property explains why the Chinese economy is
soaring and why citizens in Singapore, the world's wealthiest per capita
country, can drive twenty miles and be in Indonesia, one of the world's many
poor nations.
Differences between rich and poor nations are not explained adequately by
many other things that are frequently put forward as explanations. The
differences are not explained by such things as the remnants of colonial
exploitation, by international corporate buccaneerism, variations in natural
resources, population densities, education levels, or by technology. They are
not explained by national cultural variation or by and I may disagree here with
Keith Crane just a little bit, the mere existence of a private market. Only by
a private market, in my assertion, that is based upon a property-based legal
system; only property, property, property explains the persistent economic gulf
between rich and poor nations.
Property establishes the maximum conditions for resource generation under
the rule of law. Because property is so important, I will define it. Before
doing so, however, I would like to make the following claim: I have as much
12 David E. Sanger & Richard W. Stevenson, Gathering on Sea Island: The Scene; World
Leaders Get a Glimpse of America's High Life, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2004, at A14.
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property as Bill Gates. Now, before Dean Gatewood drags me away in
embarrassment and shame, let me explain what I mean when I say, "I have as
much property as Bill Gates." In the sense that I am using it here, property is
a legal right, a type of law that relates people to each other with respect to
limited resources. Property is not the resources themselves. Therefore Bill
Gates and I do have exactly the same property; we have the same rights, even
as he owns over 100,000 times my resources.
Specifically, property is the legal right of ownership that allows us to keep
others, including the state itself in most instances, from interfering with the
resources that we produce or acquire, without coercion, cause, or theft. The
right to keep others from interfering is sometimes called "the right of
exclusion." Commentators as varied as Thomas Hobbes, William Blackstone,
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and the progenitor of modem sociology, Emile
Durkheim, have all identified the right to exclude others from resources as the
essence of what it means to have property.
I do not want to argue with law professors in the room who are going to go
through the difficult and problematic definitions of property that have existed
at common law. I want you to accept-give judicial notice to, if you will-the
essence of property as being the right to tell others to stay away, to keep off,
not to interfere with something that is proper to me or to you. Property defines
and protects what is legally proper to me and what is proper to you. Each of
us can use property to keep others from interfering with, infringing upon, or
trespassing on what we have. Here, I am talking about private property, not
public property, or even common property.
So far, my claim about the efficacy of the exclusionary right called property
has been unsupported, but there is increasing empirical evidence to support
this claim. A 2002 study concluded that nations with "very high" protection
of property had a per capita income of $23,700 annually; "high" property
protection, $13,000 annually; "moderate" property protection, $4,900
annually; "low" property protection, $3,000 annually; and "very low"
protection averaged $2,600 per capita annually.' 3 I believe both Iraq and
Afghanistan are well under even the low figure in that regard. Another study
found that countries that strengthened the property right the most during the
period from 1975 to 1995 registered a 2.7% annual GNP growth, whereas
those nations that weakened the property right the most during that period
averaged 0.6% annual GNP decline. 4 A 1988 analysis of all studies then
13 GERALD P. O'DRIscoLL, JR. ET AL., 2002 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM 37, 40 (2002).
14 JAMES D. GWANTREY ET AL., EcoNoMic FREEDOM OF THE WORLD: 1975-1995 99-100
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available concluded that property-strong nations grow at three times the annual
rate of property-weak nations.'5
I want to point out something to the audience. Economic historians often
place the widespread institution of property in England and in the Netherlands
between two and three hundred years ago. 6 I want to point out something
interesting to you about growth. If, since that time, being property-strong, as
opposed to being property-weak, accounted for only two percent higher growth
per year in the property strong nations, can you even imagine the difference in
the annual per capita income over a couple of hundred years? At two percent,
in approximately thirty-five and a half years, one nation would have twice the
per capita income of another that was property-weak, the property-strong
nation having doubled in that time. In 200 years there is a sixty-seven-fold
difference. The property-strong nation would have sixty-seven times the
annual per capita income as the property-weak nation.
I made up those figures (except for the doubling, the doubling figures are
correct). I made up the idea that a property-strong nation is necessarily two
percent annually of a higher increase in per capita income. But my example
gives you some inkling why Western nations in particular are so much more
wealthy than the rest of the world. Because at the heart of the legal systems
of all Western nations is a very strong view of what is proper to me and what
is proper to you; what is proper to their citizens, what is property. If you look
at the constitutions of Europe you find this. Some of those countries are social
welfare states but they still have a very strong concept of property.' 7 I was in
Innsbruck a couple of summers ago and all around town there were signs that
said "Privat Grdind," which I took to mean, "private ground, no trespassing."
That is a very strong indication of the exclusionary right of property.
How is it that property-strong legal systems promote maximum conditions
for increasing national prosperity? I can only give you a quick summary here,
we could go on for a great length of time, but in quick summary, strong
property systems, number one, provide the greatest incentive and certainty
(1996).
"s Gerald W. Scully, The Institutional Framework and Economic Development, 96 J. POL.
EcON. 652 (1988).
'" See, e.g., Alan Macfarlane, The Mystery of Property: Inheritance and Industrialization
in England and Japan, at http://www.alanmacfarlane.com/TEXTS/property-japan.pdf (last
visited Sept. 23, 2004).
" See, e.g., Tonya R. Draeger, Comment, Property as a Fundamental Right in the United
States and Germany: A comparison of TakingsJurisprudence, 14 TRANSNAT'LLAW 363,380-81
(2001).
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which are necessary for new resource development in a private market system.
As economists have long believed, something quite natural to human behavior
induces people to produce more when they have this kind of incentive and
certainty, when they get to keep the increase from their efforts for themselves
and for their families. Certainty about the stability of property also encourages
the investment of resources in fixed locations such as businesses and business
constructions; it also provides the certainty necessary to increase production
from private resources. Douglass North won a Nobel Prize in 1993 in part
because he traced in Europe how people began to put their resources in fixed
locations once the kings, the state, could no longer arbitrarily take these
resources. 1
The second thing that property does is to permit residents to work outside
their homes by formally protecting land and housing from seizure by others.
I do not know to what extent this is a problem in Afghanistan and Iraq, but in
many parts of South America, in many parts of Africa, and in parts of
Southeast Asia, it is a truism that people stay at home rather than go out and
work so that they can protect their land from being taken by others.
The third thing that property does is to facilitate the generation of the
development capital that Tim Mills told us was greatly needed in Iraq.19
Property facilitates the generation of development capital from land and other
resources by enabling these resources to be put up to secure loans at reasonable
rates of interest. The purchase price of money is much lower if you can put up
your land to secure a loan-this is the theory of Hemando de Soto, the
Peruvian economist.2° I was privileged to meet him two weeks ago. He is now
working in Egypt helping to establish land ownership for people who do not
own land, but who live on land. The government has very high hopes in Egypt
that this will help small businesses grow through being able to obtain capital
at reasonable rates or reasonable prices.
The last thing that property does: it makes resources, especially resources
from land more easily divisible so they can be transferred to those who value
them most. That is just basic economics. From the stimulus to new resource
development that property provides, we can draw the following conclusion: a
nation should apply property to whatever it wants its citizens to produce more
18 See Lennart Jrberg, Presentation Speech, http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/1993/
presentation-speech.html (last modified July 1, 2003).
'9 See infra at p. 197.
20 See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INViSiBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD
WORLD 178 (1988).
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of. Whether it is widgets or something else, make production legally proper,
so people can exercise the right of property over production. This gives them
incentive and certainty by creating a stable, enforceable expectation of the
right to keep others from interfering with what an owner has and what an
owner produces. This is the way to develop more of the resources associated
with whatever people want to call prosperity. Notice that I am not recom-
mending that the U.S. export to Iraq and Afghanistan any particular set of U.S.
laws, like the Uniform Commercial Code or the Restatement of Property. But
I am recommending a general concept for consideration, whether it is in the
creation of new constitutions or in the development of new commercial law.
That is what I am calling the "concept" of property.
How does this relate to Iraq and Afghanistan? Much of what General
Shinseki, and various panels, and what Tim Mills and Keith Crane, and others
have talked about fits under my idea of property under the rule of law in a
private marketplace. The need for security of one's person against violence in
those countries is definitely property-related in "Reed's World of Property,"
if we only consider that one's body and exercise of his or her faculties is the
primary resource on which the production of other resources is predicated.
Property enforcement is a very important part of property-based legal system.
If there is no enforcement, no security of property will exist. Some things that
have already been mentioned that fit under the heading of the importance of
property: Tim Mills has mentioned intellectual property and he has mentioned
predatory business practices;2 I think Keith Crane mentioned better police
training and how important that was.22 All of that fits neatly in "Reed's World
of Property."
I think it is very important though to talk about this not as a variety of
different kinds of things that people might need to do, but as central to a key
understanding of why Western nations are so prosperous and why many other
nations of the world are so poor. The adequate implementation and enforce-
ment of property is fundamental to the creation of a prosperous private market
in Iraq and Afghanistan. If this process is not easy it is nonetheless necessary
and required. The beginning is for us to understand what creates prosperity
and how to communicate it adequately by asserting and showing that we are
in those countries in order to establish and protect what the people themselves
believe is proper to them. Not what we want for them, but what they want for
themselves.
21 See infra p. 199.
22 See infra p. 209.
2004]

